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Drab: Constitutional Law: Fact of Factor: The Supreme Court Eliminates
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: FACT OR FACTOR: THE SUPREME
COURT ELIMINATES SENTENCING FACTORS AND THE
FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES

United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005)
Michelle Reiss Drab*
A jury convicted Respondent Booker of possession with intent to
distribute at least fifty grams of cocaine,' an offense carrying a sentence
of 210 to 262 months in prison according to the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines (the "Guidelines"). 2 At a later sentencing hearing, the judge
found by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent Booker
possessed an additional 566 grams of cocaine and was guilty of
obstructing justice, warranting a sentence of 360 months to life according
to the Guidelines.' Booker appealed the thirty year sentence imposed by
the judge.4 Relying on Blakely v. Washington,5 the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the sentence
violated the Sixth Amendment.6
Respondent Fanfan was convicted by a jury of possession with intent
to distribute 500 or more grams of cocaine, 7 an offense carrying a sentence

* I would like to thank my parents for supporting me in my education and my life. I would
also like to thank my husband for centering my world. My world is a better place and I am a better
person because of you.
1. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 746 (2005) (Stevens, J.). The evidence reflected
that Respondent Booker possessed 92.5 grams of cocaine base (crack). Id. (Stevens, J.).
2. Id. (Stevens, J.). Congress delegated authority to the United States Sentencing
Commission, pursuant to the Federal Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, to create the Guidelines in
an effort to reduce sentencing disparities. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,362, 374 (1989).
The Supreme Court approved the delegation of authority in its decision in Mistretta, and has
consistently held that the Guidelines have the force and effect of laws. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 750
(Stevens, J.). For a discussion of the history, purpose, and development of the Guidelines, see
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 361.
3. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 746 (Stevens, J.).
4. Id. (Stevens, J.).
5. 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). The Court in Blakely held a sentence imposed under the State of
Washington's determinate sentencing scheme to be unconstitutional. Id. at 2538. The Court stated
that it was not holding all determinate sentencing schemes unconstitutional, id. at 2540, and was
expressing no opinion on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Id.at 2538 n.9. In her dissent, Justice
O'Connor suggested the Blakely decision would impact the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and
drew a comparison between the Federal Guidelines and the Washington State Guidelines. Id. at
2549-50 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
6. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 746-47 (Stevens, J.).
7. Id. at 747 (Stevens, J.).
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of up to seventy-eight months in prison.' At the sentencing hearing, the
judge found additional facts that mandated a sentence of 188 to 235
months according to the Guidelines. 9 However, relying on Blakely, the
judge refused to impose the longer sentence and sentenced Respondent
Fanfan solely according to the jury verdict.'
Petitioner filed a notice of appeal in the First Circuit in Respondent
Fanfan's case and petitioned for writ of certiorari in both cases." The
Supreme Court granted both petitions and, in a two-part decision affirming
its holding in Apprendi v. New Jersey,12 HELD, 1) Any fact (other than a
prior conviction) that is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the
maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury
verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt;' 3 and 2) The provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act
making the Guidelines mandatory are incompatible with the above holding
and must be severed and excised.'4
The Sixth Amendment 5 affords every "'criminal defendant the right
to demand that a jury find him guilty of all the elements of the crime with
which he is charged."" 6 While such elements indisputably warrant proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, 7 other aspects of the offense--characterized
as sentencing factors-may, and sometimes must, be determined by a
judge based upon a preponderance of the evidence. 8 Over many cases and

8. Id. (Stevens, J.).
9. Id. (Stevens, J.).
10. Id.(Stevens, J.).
11. Id. (Stevens, J.).
12. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). The Court in Apprendi held that other than a prior conviction, any
fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum must be submitted to a
jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 490.
13. Id.at 756. (Stevens, J.).
14. Id. at 756-57 (Breyer, J.). The Court specifically excised 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (Supp.
2004), which makes the Guidelines mandatory, and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (main ed. & Supp. 2004),
which depends on the mandatory nature of the Guidelines. Id. (Breyer, J.).
15. The Sixth Amendment states, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
ight to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury.., to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation; [and] to be confronted with the witnesses against him.... U.S. CONST. amend.
vi.
16. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 748 (Stevens, J.) (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506,
511 (1995)).
17. Id. at 748 (Stevens, J.) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)).
18. Id. at 749-50 (Stevens, J.) (noting that the Guidelines raise constitutional concerns
because they are binding on district judges); see also McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79,81-82
(1986) (discussing the constitutionality of the state's Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act
requiring a judge to impose a minimum five year sentence upon his finding that the defendant
"visibly possessed a firearm"').
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several decades, the Supreme Court has wrestled with the constitutional
distinction between a sentencing factor and an element of a crime.19
The Court confronted this issue in McMillan v. Pennsylvania,where a
judge's finding that the defendant had visibly possessed a firearm, based
on a preponderance of the evidence, raised the minimum sentence to five
years in prison.2" The case implicated Pennsylvania's Mandatory
Minimum Sentencing Act.2 ' Although the sentencing judge found the Act
unconstitutional and refused to apply it, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
disagreed and remanded.22 The United States Supreme Court, in a five to
four decision,23 affirmed the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.24 Relying on
Pattersonv. New York,25 the Court reasoned that the State need not prove
every fact influencing the severity of punishment beyond a reasonable
doubt.26 Instead, the Court emphasized the Legislature's intent that visible
possession be a sentencing factor and not an element of the crime.27 While
recognizing there would be constitutional limits to the State's power to
define the elements of a crime, the Court did not attempt to define those

19. See, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 474 (2000) (describing "analytical
tensions" in the relevant jurisprudence).
20. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 81. The statute provided that, for certain enumerated felonies, if
the judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant visibly possessed a firearm
during the commission of the offense, the defendant would be subject to a minimum prison
sentence of five years. Id. Pursuant to the Act, the judge had no discretion to impose a lower
sentence. Id. at 81-82.
21. Id. at 80. The sentencing portion of the Pennsylvania Act, § 9712(b) provided:
"Provisions of this section shall not be an element of the crime and notice thereof
to the defendant shall not be required prior to conviction .... The applicability
of this section shall be determined at sentencing. The court shall consider any
evidence presented at trial and shall afford the Commonwealth and the defendant
an opportunity to present any necessary additional evidence and shall determine,
by a preponderance of the evidence, if this section is applicable."
Id. at 81 n.l (quoting 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9712 (1982)).
22. Id. at 82-83.
23. Id. at 80. Justice Stevens, who wrote the portion of the instant Court's opinion holding
Apprendi applicable to the Guidelines, Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756 (Stevens, J.), dissented in
McMillan based on reasoning similar to that in the instant decision, arguing that "when the State
threatens to stigmatize or incarcerate an individual... it may do so only if it proves the elements
of the prohibited transaction beyond a reasonable doubt." McMillan, 477 U.S. at 98 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)).
24. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 84.
25. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
26. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 84. The McMillan Court said Pattersonhad rejected the idea that
all facts linked to punishment need to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, id. at 84, and later said,
"the present case is controlled by Patterson."Id. at 85.
27. Id. at 85-86.
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limits.2" With its decision, the Court established only that any impact on
punishment, especially by a factor that had always been considered to bear
on punishment, would not make that factor an element. 9
The Court faced this issue again in Almendarez-Torres v. United
States.3" In Almendarez-Torres, the defendant, a deported alien, was
convicted of returning to the United States without permission, warranting
a maximum prison sentence of two years.3' At a later sentencing hearing,
the judge found, based on the defendant's admission, that his initial
deportation was pursuant to three prior aggravated felony convictions.32
This finding increased the maximum sentence from two to twenty years.33
The defendant appealed, arguing that his prior convictions were elements
of the crime and should have been charged in the indictment. 34 Again in a
split decision, the Supreme Court disagreed with the defendant and
affirmed his conviction.35 The Court concluded that its precedents stood
only for the "proposition that sometimes the Constitution does require
(though sometimes it does not require) the State to treat a sentencing factor
as an element., 36 In this case, the Court reasoned that recidivism was a
typical sentencing factor 7 and that Congress intended it as such in the
statute at issue.38 Thus, although the finding of recidivism raised the
defendant's maximum sentence, the Court concluded that the Constitution
did not require recidivism be deemed an element of the offense.39
Finally, in Apprendi v. New Jersey,the Court established a specific test
to distinguish an element of a crime from a sentencing factor. 40 The state

28. Id.at 86.
29. Id.at 89-90.
30. 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
31. Id.at 226-27. The defendant was charged with, and pleaded guilty to, a violation of 8
U.S.C. § 1326 (1988). Id.
32. Id.at 227.
33. Id. at 226. The District Court found a sentencing range of seventy-seven to ninety-six
months applicable under the Guidelines and sentenced Almendarez-Torres to eighty-five months
in prison. Id. at 227.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 247-48.
36. Id. at 242 (emphasis in original). The Court relied on Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684
(1975), and Pattersonv. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977), to reach this conclusion. SeeAlmendarezTorres, 523 U.S. at 240-42.
37. Id. at 230.
38. Id.at 235.
39. Id.at 247.
40. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,490 (2000). The Court applied the rule it had first
expressed in a footnote in an earlier case, Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999).
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. The Jones court stated the principle that "any fact (other than a prior
conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment,
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Jones, 526 U.S. at 243 n.6.
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"hate crime" statute at issue authorized an increase in the defendant's
maximum punishment based on a finding of "biased purpose" by the judge
at sentencing.4 ' The Court held the statute unconstitutional and firmly
declared that any fact, other than that of a prior conviction, that "increases
the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
' The Court's
submitted to ajury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."42
holding departed from its holdings in McMillan4 3 andAlmendarez-Torres4
and made clear that the determination of a sentencing factor or element of
a crime would be based on the impact on punishment, regardless of
legislative intent or the factor's traditional application.45 The Court
described the relevant inquiry as "one not of form, but of effect,"
particularly, the effect on punishment.' 6
In the instant case, the Respondents' sentences were increased
following findings of fact made by a judge at a sentencing hearing, but
were not raised above the statutory maximum.47 The sentences remained
within the statutory range, but were increased above the maximum that the
Guidelines would have imposed on the basis of the jury verdict.48 Because
of additional findings made by the judge at the sentencing hearing, the
Guidelines mandated a longer sentence.49

41. Id. at 470. Specifically, the state hate crime statute provided for an additional ten to
twenty year prison term if the trial judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant committed the crime ."with a purpose to intimidate an individual or group of individuals
because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity."' Id.at 468-69
(quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e) (West Supp. 2000)).
42. Id.at 490.
43. McMillan deferred to the legislature's definition of a crime and reasoned that the statute
at issue merely assigned a precise weight to a traditional sentencing factor. McMillan v.
Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 86, 89-90 (1986).
44. Almendarez-Torres held that recidivism, a traditional sentencing factor, need not be
treated as an element of the offense. 523 U.S. at 247.
45. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
46. Id.at 494.
47. United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738, 746 (2005) (Stevens, J.). The Court noted that
the statutory range for Respondent Booker's conviction was ten years to life in prison. Id. (Stevens,
J.). The Court did not mention the statutory range authorized by Respondent Fanfan's conviction.
See id. (Stevens, J.).
48. Id. (Stevens, J.). The Guidelines provided for a sentence of 210 to 262 months based on
Respondent Booker's conviction and criminal history. Id. (Stevens, J.). In Respondent Fanfan's
case, the Guidelines authorized a seventy-eight month sentence based on the jury verdict. Id. at 747
(Stevens, J.).
49. Id. at 746-47 (Stevens, J.). The findings of the judge at sentencing increased Respondent
Booker's range to 360 months to life. Id. at 746 (Stevens, J.). The judge's additional findings at
sentencing increased Respondent Fanfan's sentence range to 188 to 235 months. Id. at 747
(Stevens, J.).
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The instant Court held that Apprendi applied to the Guidelines.5" The
Court reasoned that the Guidelines were mandatory and binding on judges
and thus had the practical force and effect of laws. 5 The instant Court
focused on the role of the jury as a protection against arbitrary and
unreasonable punishments.52 The Court expressed concern that sentence
enhancements had become more serious and had begun to diminish the
role of the jury.53 In an effort to preserve the jury's role, the Court clarified
that the "statutory maximum" referred to in the Apprendi rule was the
maximum sentence that could be imposed "'solely on the basis of the facts
reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant."' 54 Lastly, the
instant Court concluded that the provisions making the Guidelines
mandatory must be severed and excised; hence the Guidelines would
become merely advisory in nature.55
The instant Court's decision effectively eliminates sentencing factors,
and at least temporarily resolves the lengthy debate over when a factor
becomes an element of the crime.56 The decision suggests a philosophical
departure from McMillan57 and a retreat from Apprendi, as well as a
movement towards a more constitutionally rigorous doctrine. 58
InApprendi,the Court clung to its precedents and established a "brightline" rule 59 to define an element of a crime. ' Apprendiheld that any factor,
except a prior conviction, that increased punishment above the statutory
maximum must be an element of the crime.6 This rule accommodated
McMillan, which addressed a factor that increased minimum punishment
50. Id. at 753 (Stevens, J.).
51. Id. at 750 (Stevens, J.).
52. Id. at 753 (Stevens, J.). The Court said, "The Framers of the Constitution understood the
threat of 'judicial despotism' that could arise from 'arbitrary punishments upon arbitrary
convictions' without the benefit of a jury in criminal cases." Id. (Stevens, J.) (quoting THE
FEDERALIST No. 83, at 499 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). The Court also
characterized the jury as a protection against the power of the government. Id. at 752 (Stevens, J.).
53. Id. at 751 (Stevens, J.).
54. Id. at 746-47 (Stevens, J.) (quoting Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2537 (2004))
(emphasis omitted).
55. See supra note 14.
56. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 474 (2000) (referring to the "'analytical
tensions' in this Court's post- Winship jurisprudence"). See generally McMillan v. Pennsylvania,
477 U.S. 79, 84-88 (1986), and Jones v. UnitedStates, 526 U.S. 227, 239-44 (1999), for analysis
and discussion ofrelevant historical cases and decisions pertaining to the sentencing factor-element
debate.
57. See infra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
58. See infra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
59. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 525 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor criticized the
Court for establishing such a test, arguing that the Court's precedents reflect a decision to consider
each case individually. Id. at 524-25 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
60. See id at 490.
61. Id.
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but did not impact maximum punishment.62 In addition, by allowing an
exception for past convictions, the rule accounted
for the Almendarez63
generally.
recidivism
and
decision
Torres
The instant Court's holding retains the past-conviction exception, but
departs significantly from McMillan,64 at least theoretically. In McMillan,
the Court refused to endorse the idea that every factor tied to punishment
must be proved to a jury.65 Yet, the instant Court expressed this exact
sentiment. 66 Emphasizing the importance of the jury and the significance
of meeting the higher burden of proof before depriving a person of
liberty,67 the instant Court specifically stated that a defendant has the right
to have every fact essential to his punishment proved to a jury.68
Ultimately, the instant Court retreated from this stance in its holding,
merely saying that the punishment cannot be greater than that authorized
by the facts found by the jury. 69 However, the instant Court's reasoning
clearly diverged from McMillan.7 °
Given the instant Court's willingness to depart from McMillan, it is
unclear why the Court retains the past-conviction exception that
accommodates Almendarez-Torres and other decisions that have
characterized recidivism as a traditional sentencing factor. 7' The exception
is not necessary to avoid a conflict with Almendarez-Torres.72 The instant

62. Id. at 487 n.13 (distinguishing the statute in McMillan for its lack of effect on the
maximum punishment).
63. Id. at 488-90. The Court distinguished Almendarez-Torres because it pertained to
recidivism, but also suggested that Almendarez-Torres may have been incorrectly decided and,
hence, that the Court's reasoning might also apply to recidivism. Id.
64. In Apprendi, Justice O'Connor argued that the Court actually overruled McMillan. Id. at
533-34 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
65. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
66. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 749 (2005) (Stevens, J.).
67. Id. at 752 (Stevens, J.) (quoting Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2543 (2004)).
The Court stated in Blakely:
[t]he Framers would not have thought it too much to demand that, before
depriving a man of three more years of his liberty, the State should suffer the
modest inconvenience of submitting its accusation to "the unanimous suffrage of
twelve of his equals and neighbours," rather than a lone employee of the State.
Blakely, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2543 (2004) (quoting 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, 343 (1769)).
68. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 752 (Stevens, J.).
69. Id. at 756 (Stevens, J.).
70. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
71. Even in Apprendi, another opinion by Justice Stevens, the Court suggested that
Almendarez-Torres was incorrectly decided. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 489-90
(2000).
72. See id. at 488. The Court suggests that, because Almendarez-Torres had admitted his
prior convictions, the constitutional burden-of-proof issue was not even before the Court in that
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Court's rule allows facts admitted by the defendant to be used in
determining the sentence and, since the petitioner in Almendarez-Torres
admitted his prior convictions, 73 the rule without the past-conviction
exception does not conflict with Almendarez-Torres.74 Furthermore, there
have been compelling arguments against allowing the past-conviction
exception, suggesting that the exception runs contrary to common law.75
Finally, the reasoning in the instant case and other recent relevant cases,
such as Apprendi and Blakely, focuses on the impact of a finding on
punishment, to the exclusion of legislative intent, textual interpretations,
or historical application as a sentencing factor.76 The instant Court never
explained why it retains the past-conviction exception, although the
exception seems inconsistent with the instant Court's underlying
philosophy.77
Prior to the instant decision, the Court appeared to be developing a rule
to identify an element of the crime that was devoid of constitutional
significance.78 Previously, the Court's reasoning and its holdings primarily

decision. Id.
73. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 227 (1998).
74. See Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 756 (Stevens, J.).
75. See, e.g., Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 261 (Scalia, J., dissenting). According to
Justice Scalia, at common law, prior convictions had to be charged in the indictment and submitted
to the jury for determination. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia further claims that, at least through
1965, it was "near-uniform practice among the States" to treat prior convictions as an element of
the offense. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia cites cases through 1967 to support his position. Id.
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Furthermore, Scalia questions the majority's reliance on Graham v. West
Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912), arguing that Graham dealt with a statute that explicitly preserved
the right to a jury determination regarding recidivism. Id. at 258 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia
claims that Graham's holding provides no support for the majority's position, but concedes that
Graham'sreasoning could be viewed the other way. Id.at 258-60 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia
further notes that while Graham and other cases allowed recidivism to be charged and tried
separately, they did not allow it to be determined by ajudge "as more likely than not." Id. at 259-60
(Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 502 (Thomas, J., concurring).
76. See Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 756 (Stevens, J.); Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531,2537
(2004); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. The rule articulated in each case defines an element of a crime
in terms of its impact on the range of punishment. Cf.McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 8991 (1986) (deferring to the legislature's judgment and holding a statute constitutional where it
assigned a punishment to a traditional sentencing factor but did not exceed the statutory maximum);
Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 228 (deferring also to the legislature's judgment and holding that
past convictions may be appropriately characterized as sentencing factors even when they increase
the maximum punishment).
77. See Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 749 (Stevens, J.). In Apprendi, the Court also raised questions
about the necessity of the past-conviction exception, but chose to leave the exception undisturbed,
explaining the issue was not properly before the Court. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 489-90. This may
apply to the instant case as well, as neither Respondent challenges his sentence on the basis of past
convictions. See Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 746 (Stevens, J.).
78. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 501-02 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the Constitution
requires a broader rule than that adopted in Apprendi and, further, that the common law understood 8
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss4/6
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took into account the amount of punishment, the historical application of
a fact in determining punishment, and the intent of the legislature.79 Even
in Apprendi, the Court's rule turned on whether the factor increased
punishment above the statutory maximum. 80 The instant Court shifts the
focus back to the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.8 ' In
effect, the instant Court fashions a rule that retreats from Apprendi 's focus
on the amount of punishment and turns the issue towards the fact of
punishment and the intermediary role of the jury.82 While the Court does
not go to the extreme of holding that all factors affecting punishment must
be proved to a jury, including
past convictions, the shift it does make
83
possibility.
this
foreshadows
The practical implications of the instant decision are far from clear."
In the short term, the decision has rendered the Guidelines merely advisory

any fact-including recidivism-that was a basis for "imposing or increasing punishment" was also
an element of an offense).
79. Id. at 490 (establishing a rule that held sentencing factors constitutional so long as they
did not exceed the statutory maximum); Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 247 (deferring to the
legislature's judgment and holding that past convictions may be appropriately characterized as
sentencing factors even when they increase the maximum punishment); McMillan v. Pennsylvania,
477 U.S. 79, 89-90 (1986) (also deferring to the legislature's judgment and holding a statute
constitutional which merely assigned a punishment to a traditional sentencing factor but did not
exceed the statutory maximum).
80. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. Apprendi characterized the relevant inquiry as "one not of
form, but of effect." Id. at 494.
81. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 749 (Stevens, J.). But see Jackie Gardina, Compromising Liberty:
A StructuralCritique of the Sentencing Guidelines, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 345 (2005), for an
alternative perspective. Gardina argues that the instant Court's decision actually diminishes the role
of the jury, stating that by making the Guidelines merely advisory, the instant Court moves them
outside the reach of the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 351. While it is true that the instant Court opts not
to engraft the right to a jury trial onto the existing system, the Court makes clear the importance
of the right to have a jury determine facts pertinent to sentencing and, in so doing, takes a firmer
stance on the issue than it has in the past. Ultimately, the Court does not move the Guidelines out
of the reach of the Sixth Amendment, but instead leaves Congress to devise an appropriate
sentencing scheme incorporating the Sixth Amendment rights. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 768 (Breyer,
J.).
82. See supranote 52 and accompanying text.
83. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 803 (Breyer, J., dissenting in part) (questioning whether Justice
Stevens's portion of the instant Court's two-part opinion is meant to encompass and disallow all
sentencing facts, including recidivism).
84. Id. at 787 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (arguing that the portion of the two-part
majority decision authored by Justice Breyer making the Guidelines advisory would cause a return
to the sentencing disparities Congress sought to eliminate); cf id. at 795 (Scalia, J., dissenting in
part) (arguing that the portion of the two-part majority decision authored by Justice Breyer and
making the Guidelines advisory would "wreak havoc" on the federal courts); Henry Weinstein &
David Rosenzweig, The Nation; How Judges Will Use DiscretionIs the Big Question, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 13, 2005, at A24 (noting that the Supreme Court's decision in Booker will give judges
significantly
greater
in imposing
criminal
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and, arguably, inconsequential.85 Judges are presently left with broad
discretion at sentencing, so long as the sentence remains within the range
87
86
authorized by the jury verdict. The Court purports to endorse this result.

However, the longterm implications of the Court's decision may ultimately
reduce, if not eliminate, judicial discretion at sentencing.88
The potential difference between short term and long term implications
of the instant Court's decision is due to a distinction between the instant
Court's rule and its reasoning. The instant Court's rule allows for
sentencing ranges and judicial discretion within such ranges as authorized
by the jury verdict.89 However, to exercise discretion within a sentencing
range, ajudge would need to make some findings, presumably findings of
fact, at sentencing.9" While the instant Court's rule allows for this result,
its reasoning does not.9 ' The Court instead reasons that the Constitution
requires any fact essential to punishment-hence any fact increasing
punishment-be proved to a jury.9 2 Thus, the instant Court's reasoning
leaves little if any room' for such judicial fact-finding at sentencing.93
The instant Court's decision may intentionally leave lawmakers in a
quandary. The Court recognizes that the constitutional rights of defendants
compete with the efficiency of today's criminal justice system.94 A simple
rule affords the opportunity for efficiency considerations to eclipse
constitutional rights.95 Conversely, the complexity of the decision prompts

85. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 790 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part) (arguing that the instant Court's
decision to excise portions of the Guidelines "[i]n order to rescue [the Guidelines] from
nullification" was not successful as the excision left the judges with the discretion they had prior
to the enactment of the Guidelines); see also id. at 787 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (arguing that
after the instant Court's decision, judges will have discretion to disregard the guidelines, resulting
in the same sentence disparities that the guidelines were designed to eliminate).
86. Id. at 756-57 (Breyer, J.).
87. See id. at 750 (Stevens, J.).
88. See Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2554-55 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(predicting how legislatures might respond to Blakely, suggesting a complex charge system that
would require all previous sentencing factors be charged as elements ofthe crime); Charlie Savage,
High Court Overturns Sentencing Guidelines;But Ruling Will Allow 'Advisory' Use By Judges,
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 13, 2005, at A l (reporting that legal analysts suspect Congress will move to
narrow sentencing ranges and ultimately decrease judicial discretion in the long term).
89. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 775 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
90. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). Justice Stevens argues that judicial fact-finding is
constitutional and permissible under the instant Court's rule (as articulated in the portion of the
two-part majority opinion he authored). Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
91. Id. at 802 (Breyer, J., dissenting in part). But see id. at 775 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part)
(arguing that the portion of the two-part majority opinion he authored, holding Blakely applicable
to the Guidelines, does not make judicial fact-finding impermissible).
92. Id. at 749 (Stevens, J.).
93. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
94. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 755-56 (Stevens, J.).
95. In his dissent in Apprendi, Justice Breyer argued that even the Apprendi rule is a
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a more thorough evaluation of sentencing practices in order to balance the
while ensuring that
competing interests of State and defendant,
96
paramount.
remain
principles
constitutional
Ultimately, the instant Court recognizes the significant and broad
impact its decision will likely have on the federal and state criminal justice
systems, but holds fast to its principles.97 Championing the jury as a check
on government power,98 the instant Court's decision revitalizes the role of
the jury as primary fact finder and vindicates the Sixth Amendment rights
of criminal defendants. 99 This decision is not only an important statement
of the rights of criminal defendants but also a powerful reminder that the
liberties we are afforded under our Constitution should neither be taken
lightly nor sacrificed for the sake of such lesser virtues as efficiency and
expediency.

"procedural ideal" that cannot be met in the "real world of criminal justice." Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 555 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
96. See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 768 (Breyer, J.). The instant Court leaves the "ball ... in
Congress' court ... to devise and install, long-term, the sentencing system, compatible with the
Constitution." Id. (Breyer, J.).
97. Id. at 781 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). In his dissent to the portion of the two-part
majority opinion authored by Justice Breyer, Justice Stevens argued that the jury system may not
be the most efficient, but "the Constitution does not permit efficiency to be our primary concern."
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
98. Id. at 752 (Stevens, J.). For a discussion of the evolution of the role of the jury at common
law, leading up to the drafting of the Sixth Amendment, see Benjamin F. Diamond, THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT: WHERE DID THE JURY Go? FLORIDA'S FLAWED SENTENCING IN DEATH PENALTY
CASES, 55 FLA. L. REv. 905, 909-11 (2003).
99. See Carl Hulse & Adam Liptak, New Fight Over ControllingPunishments Is Widely
Seen, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13,2005, at A29 (reporting that many judges, concerned over unnecessarily
harsh sentences, are happy with the instant Court's decision); Savage, supra note 88 (reporting that
the instant decision upheld jury trial rights).
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